[#5561] [ltp ]Kernel dump info when run ltp test cases access02, chown03, fchmod06, fchown03, fchown04

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[#5561] [ltp ]Kernel dump info when run ltp test cases access02, chown03, fchmod06, fchown03, fchown04

Submitted By: Vivi Li

Open Date

2009-09-27 03:43:16     Close Date

2009-10-19 23:27:22

Priority:

Medium     Assignee:

Graf Yang

Status:

Closed     Fixed In Release:

N/A

Found In Release:

2010R1     Release:

Category:

Kernel Functions     Board:

N/A

Processor:

ALL     Silicon Revision:

Is this bug repeatable?:

Yes     Resolution:

Fixed

Uboot version or rev.:

    Toolchain version or rev.:

gcc4.1-09r1-rc9

App binary format:

N/A     

Summary: [ltp ]Kernel dump info when run ltp test cases access02, chown03, fchmod06, fchown03, fchown04

Details:

 

Kernel dump info when run ltp test cases access02, chown03, fchmod06, fchown03, fchown04.

 

Bellow is the log for access02, error info is similar with chown03, fchmod06, fchown03, fchown04.

--

root:/> access02

accessI2    1  PASS  :  Functionality of access() for test_file1, successfulllegal use of supervisor resource

<5> - Attempted to use a Supervisor register or instruction from User mode.

<5>   Supervisor resources are registers and instructions that are reserved

<5>   for Supervisor use: Supervisor only registers, all MMRs, and Supervisor

<5>   only instructions.

Deferred Exception context

CURRENT PROCESS:

COMM=access02 PID=162

CPU = 0

TEXT = 0x02d40040-0x02d4bca0        DATA = 0x02d4bca4-0x02d4eb2c

BSS = 0x02d4eb2c-0x02d53b14  USER-STACK = 0x02d5bf68

 

return address: [0x02d47758]; contents of:

0x02d47730:  6501  3020  bbf1  3031  6007  3211  6421  bbf1

0x02d47740:  640f  9110  0c00  17fa  c682  8017  6420  6001

0x02d47750:  e300  1a36  3200  3208 [9305] bbf6  b9fa  67ff

0x02d47760:  6c21  0c07  6c22  bbfa  6fe2  9110  9308  17f7

 

ADSP-BF537-0.2 500(MHz CCLK) 125(MHz SCLK) (mpu off)

Linux version 2.6.31-ADI-2010R1-pre-svn7464 (test@uclinux50-bf537-ad9960-ad1836) (gcc version 4.1.2 (ADI svn)) #2 Fri Sep 25 22:9

 

SEQUENCER STATUS:               Not tainted

SEQSTAT: 0000202e  IPEND: 0008  IMASK: ffff  SYSCFG: 0006

  EXCAUSE   : 0x2e

  physical IVG3 asserted : <0xffa00800> { _trap + 0x0 }

RETE: <0x00000000> /* Maybe null pointer? */

RETN: <0x02a88000> /* kernel dynamic memory */

RETX: <0x00000480> /* Maybe fixed code section */

RETS: <0x02d47754> [ access02 + 0x7714 ]

PC  : <0x02d47758> [ access02 + 0x7718 ]

DCPLB_FAULT_ADDR: <0xfffffffc> /* core mmrs */

ICPLB_FAULT_ADDR: <0x02d47758> [ access02 + 0x7718 ]

PROCESSOR STATE:

R0 : ffffffff    R1 : 00000010    R2 : 00000003    R3 : 00000021

R4 : 02d4e5a4    R5 : 02d4e5ac    R6 : 02d5bd8c    R7 : 00000003

P0 : ffffffff    P1 : ffffffff    P2 : 02d4fbcc    P3 : 02d5bf6c

P4 : 02d4eb28    P5 : 02d4bca4    FP : 02d5bd6c    SP : 02a87f24

LB0: 02d463af    LT0: 02d463ae    LC0: 00000000

LB1: 02d4a8c5    LT1: 02d4a8be    LC1: 00000000

B0 : 00000000    L0 : 00000000    M0 : 00000000    I0 : 02d5bba8

B1 : 00000000    L1 : 00000000    M1 : 00000000    I1 : 02d5bf6c

B2 : 00000000    L2 : 00000000    M2 : 00000000    I2 : 00000000

B3 : 00000000    L3 : 00000000    M3 : 00000000    I3 : 00000000

A0.w: 00000000   A0.x: 00000000   A1.w: 00000000   A1.x: 00000000

USP : 02d5bd5c  ASTAT: 02000000

 

Hardware Trace:

   0 Target : <0x00004fc0> { _trap_c + 0x0 }

     Source : <0xffa00794> { _exception_to_level5 + 0xa4 } CALL pcrel

   1 Target : <0xffa006f0> { _exception_to_level5 + 0x0 }

     Source : <0xffa005a4> { _bfin_return_from_exception + 0x20 } RTX

   2 Target : <0xffa00584> { _bfin_return_from_exception + 0x0 }

     Source : <0xffa00648> { _ex_trap_c + 0x74 } JUMP.S

   3 Target : <0xffa005d4> { _ex_trap_c + 0x0 }

     Source : <0xffa00868> { _trap + 0x68 } JUMP (P4)

   4 Target : <0xffa00820> { _trap + 0x20 }

     Source : <0xffa0081c> { _trap + 0x1c } IF !CC JUMP

   5 Target : <0xffa00800> { _trap + 0x0 }

     Source : <0x02d47756> [ access02 + 0x7716 ] 0x3208

   6 Target : <0x02d47754> [ access02 + 0x7714 ]

     Source : <0x02d4ac28> [ access02 + 0xabe8 ] RTS

   7 Target : <0x02d4ac20> [ access02 + 0xabe0 ]

     Source : <0x02d4863e> [ access02 + 0x85fe ] RTS

   8 Target : <0x02d48636> [ access02 + 0x85f6 ]

     Source : <0x02d48670> [ access02 + 0x8630 ] JUMP.S

   9 Target : <0x02d48668> [ access02 + 0x8628 ]

     Source : <0x02d44a18> [ access02 + 0x49d8 ] RTS

  10 Target : <0x02d44a08> [ access02 + 0x49c8 ]

     Source : <0x02d48664> [ access02 + 0x8624 ] CALL pcrel

  11 Target : <0x02d48664> [ access02 + 0x8624 ]

     Source : <0x02d48656> [ access02 + 0x8616 ] IF !CC JUMP

  12 Target : <0x02d4864e> [ access02 + 0x860e ]

     Source : <0xffa00d52> { __common_int_entry + 0xda } RTI

  13 Target : <0xffa00cf0> { __common_int_entry + 0x78 }

     Source : <0xffa01134> { _evt_system_call + 0x64 } JUMP.S

  14 Target : <0xffa01134> { _evt_system_call + 0x64 }

     Source : <0xffa009f0> { _system_call + 0xb8 } RTS

  15 Target : <0xffa009ec> { _system_call + 0xb4 }

     Source : <0xffa009dc> { _system_call + 0xa4 } IF !CC JUMP

Userspace Stack

Stack info:

SP: [0x02d5bd5c] <0x02d5bd5c> [ access02 + 0x1bd5c ]

FP: (0x02d5bd6c)

Memory from 0x02d5bd50 to 02d5c000

02d5bd50: 02d4bca4  02d4eb28  00000003 [00000000] 00000000  00000000  02d5bd98 (02d5bda8)

02d5bd70:<02d4713e> 00000000  02d4fbb0  02d4bc68  00000001  00000000  02d5bdac  02d4e5b0

02d5bd90: 02d4bf78  00000000  02d43074  02d43074  00000000  00000000 <02d5bed0><02d408f6>

02d5bdb0: 00000000  02d4bf78  02d4f940  02d4e8c0  02d4e8f8  00008030  00000002 <02d45eee>

02d5bdd0: 02d4f824  02d4f84b  02d5bdfc <02d46c0e> 02d4e9bc  02d4812c  0208a000  00000104

02d5bdf0: 02d4f854  00000005  02d4f838  02d5be4c <02d44bb2> 02d4e9dc  02d4812c  02d4812c

02d5be10: 02d5be2c  00000000  00000001  02d4f840  00000100  02d48ac4  00000001  00000000

02d5be30: 00000000  02d5be64 <02d44c3a> 02d4f824  02d4e76c  02d5beb8  02d5be80  02d5be80

02d5be50:<02d44ab2> 02d4f824  02d4e76c  02d5beb8  00000000  02d4e9dc  00000100 <02d4701c>

02d5be70:<02d5bed0><02d40fb4> 00000100  02d5be98  02d5beb8 <02d4069c> 00000000  02d5bea8

02d5be90: 02d5beb8 <02d40788> 00000000  02d4bc68  000001a4  000001a4  622f2123  732f6e69

02d5beb0: 02000a68  00000005  00000001 <02d40396> 00000000  00000001  02d43074  00636261

02d5bed0: 02d5bf10 <02d40276> 00000000  00000002  00000001  02d4bcf0  02d4bcfc  02d5bf0c

02d5bef0:<02d4683c> 00000000  00000002  00000000  00000001  00000001  02d4bd10  02d4bd1c

02d5bf10: 02d5bf28 <02d482b8> 00000000  00000001  02d5bf6c  00000000  00000000 <02b14dde>

02d5bf30: 02d4bca4  0297e1e0  0297e1a0  00000000  02b609a8  029ecff1  029ecff6  02d4013c

02d5bf50: 00000000  00000000  02d4bc68  02d4bc7a  00000000  02b609a8  00000001  02d5bf8f

02d5bf70: 00000000  02d5bf98  02d5bfa3  02d5bfcb  02d5bfdf  02d5bfe5  00000000  61000000

02d5bf90: 73656363  00323073  4d524554  6e696c3d  50007875  3d485441  6e69622f  73752f3a

02d5bfb0: 69622f72  732f3a6e  3a6e6962  7273752f  6962732f  622f3a6e  48006e69  5f485355

02d5bfd0: 53524556  3d4e4f49  35312e31  5000312e  2f3d4457  504d5400  6d742f3d  622f0070

02d5bff0: 612f6e69  73656363  00323073  00000000

Return addresses in stack:

   frame  1 : <0x02d4713e> [ access02 + 0x70fe ]

    address : <0x02d5bed0> [ access02 + 0x1bed0 ]

    address : <0x02d408f6> [ access02 + 0x8b6 ]

    address : <0x02d45eee> [ access02 + 0x5eae ]

    address : <0x02d46c0e> [ access02 + 0x6bce ]

    address : <0x02d44bb2> [ access02 + 0x4b72 ]

    address : <0x02d44c3a> [ access02 + 0x4bfa ]

    address : <0x02d44ab2> [ access02 + 0x4a72 ]

    address : <0x02d4701c> [ access02 + 0x6fdc ]

    address : <0x02d5bed0> [ access02 + 0x1bed0 ]

    address : <0x02d40fb4> [ access02 + 0xf74 ]

    address : <0x02d4069c> [ access02 + 0x65c ]

    address : <0x02d40788> [ access02 + 0x748 ]

    address : <0x02d40396> [ access02 + 0x356 ]

    address : <0x02d40276> [ access02 + 0x236 ]

    address : <0x02d4683c> [ access02 + 0x67fc ]

    address : <0x02d482b8> [ access02 + 0x8278 ]

    address : <0x02b14dde> [ sh + 0x14dde ]

 

access02    2  PASS  :  Functionality of access() for test_file2, successful

access02    3  BROK  :  Unexpected signal 4 received.

access02    4  BROK  :  Remaining cases broken

access02    0  WARN  :  tst_rmdir(): rmobj(/tmp/accjdnhXa) failed: rmdir(/tmp/accjdnhXa) failed; errno=39: Directory not empty

access02    5  FAIL  :  Fail to execute the test_file3

access02    6  PASS  :  Functionality of access() for sym_file, successful

access02    0  WARN  :  tst_rmdir(): rmobj(/tmp/accjdnhXa) failed: rmdir(/tmp/accjdnhXa) failed; errno=39: Directory not empty

root:~>

--

 

Follow-ups

 

--- Graf Yang                                                2009-10-12 05:44:58

The reason of access02's crash is because of mmap failed,

chown0X's crash seems have different reasons.

 

--- Graf Yang                                                2009-10-15 23:21:53

Fixed after apply upstream patch 239e40d..0583f16

chown0x/fchxxx test also pass with properly set their permissions.

 

--- Vivi Li                                                  2009-10-19 23:27:22

OK now. Close it.

 

 

 

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